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Jeffrey Bean, East‐West 
Center in Washington 
VisiƟng Fellow, explains 
that “Adjustments  to 




chains and investments 
outside of China, 
including in Southeast 
Asia, should be 
supported.“ 
Responding to oncoming U.S.‐China commercial fricƟon in recent years, firms operaƟng in the complex, 
dense semiconductor ecosystem centered on the United States and Northeast Asia began a gradual 
evaluaƟon of whether and how to reshape their supply chains and investments, and sƟll maximize 
profit. As a foundaƟonal industry for maintaining economic compeƟƟveness and naƟonal security, 
semiconductors serve as a keystone in U.S. and Japanese technological leadership.  Against the 
backdrop of nascent U.S.‐China technology compeƟƟon and the standsƟll from the coronavirus, 
adjustments  to enhance resiliency and miƟgate disrupƟon through developing semiconductor supply 
chains and investments outside of China, including in Southeast Asia, should be supported.     
The Japanese government’s April 8, 2020, announcement that it will support Japanese corporaƟons in 
shiŌing operaƟons out of China and reducing dependency on Chinese inputs reflects this impulse. While 
impressive sounding, the $2.2 billion Japan allocated as part of its larger sƟmulus package to counter 
the headwinds of the coronavirus, is a mere drop in the bucket for the semiconductor industry of what 
would be an immense cost to totally shiŌ operaƟons and supply chains out of China. Semiconductor 
manufacturing is among the most capital‐intensive industries in the global economy. Moreover, costs 
within Japan to “bring manufacturing back” are very high. Despite this – while Japan is not the super 
power it once was in semiconductors – it sƟll has cards to play.  
Concurrently, officials in the United States, through a combinaƟon of  concerns over security and lack of 
supply chain redundancy, are also pushing for new investments to locate a cuƫng‐edge fabricaƟon 
facility in the conƟnental U.S. One idea is to build a new foundry operated by Taiwanese pure‐play giant 
TSMC. The Trump administraƟon is considering other incenƟves to increase aƩracƟveness for 
companies to invest in new front‐end faciliƟes in the United States, to maintain the U.S. dominant 
posiƟon in the industry and secure supply for military applicaƟons. Global semiconductor companies 
may be reluctant. AŌer all, investments, faciliƟes, and the support eco‐system in China are in place, and 
revenues from the Chinese market enable U.S. semiconductor firms to reinvest in the research and 
development that allows them to maintain their market lead. And in the United States, there may be 
limits on the pool of human capital to rapidly absorb extensive new advanced manufacturing capacity.    
But there are two factors in a geopoliƟcal vise closing at unequal speed on companies in the industry 
that will increase supply chain disrupƟon: China’s own semiconductor efforts and U.S.‐Japanese export 
controls. As part of the Made in China 2025 industrial policy iniƟaƟve, General Secretary Xi Jinping and 
Chinese Communist Party leadership have tripled down to overcome past failures in Chinese efforts to 
develop indigenous semiconductor manufacturing capability. Following penalƟes brought by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce against ZTE and then Huawei, the Chinese leadership’s resolve to reduce its 
dependence on U.S. semiconductors has crystalized. The Chinese government intends to halve U.S. 
sourced semiconductor imports by 2025 and be totally independent of U.S. chips by 2030. And while 
behind in many areas and accounƟng for the usual state‐directed stumbles, Chinese companies have 
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made some progress in designing AI chips and at the lower end of the memory storage market. Even if the 
overall goals may prove unaƩainable, firms should heed the wriƟng on the wall – China only wants to buy 
U.S. chips for the short term and as soon as possible end all foreign dependence.  
Leaders in the United States and Japan are also craŌing some of their first salvos in what is likely to be a 
generaƟon‐long compeƟƟon over technology and the future of the regional economic order with China. The 
Trump administraƟon, acƟng on a biparƟsan impetus aŌer years of Chinese IP theŌ and recognizing 
mounƟng hardware security concerns, has begun planning to implement addiƟonal export controls directed 
at Chinese companies and certain chips. Japan and the United States have also reportedly iniƟated dialogue 
about coordinaƟng export controls in the area of semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  
CollecƟvely, these policies will be highly disrupƟve to semiconductor value chains and downstream 
technology companies like Apple and NEC, which are dependent on these networks to maintain a cadence of 
new products every 18‐24 months. Japan’s acƟon to place export controls on criƟcal chemical inputs for 
South Korean semiconductor firms in the summer of 2019 serves as a warning of the supply chain’s 
vulnerability to miscalculated policy. In short, Washington and Tokyo must tread carefully. Without support 
from other key actors like South Korea, Taiwan, and the Netherlands, and by failing to incorporate industry 
input, poorly calibrated export controls on semiconductors could severely damage U.S. and Japanese 
companies’ compeƟƟveness.      
A third course out of the bind for semiconductor firms may be available: a combinaƟon of on‐shoring, 
staying in China, and relocaƟon. For semiconductor companies, the relocaƟon porƟon will not happen 
overnight. ShiŌing supply chains takes Ɵme for a capital‐intensive industry driven by know‐how that has 
limited redundancy. DesƟnaƟons worth exploring from both cost and security perspecƟves as alternaƟves to 
China include South and Southeast Asia. Specific ASEAN countries, namely Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Singapore, offer good prospects for investment. There is an exisƟng industry presence in several locaƟons in 
the region. MulƟnaƟonal firms already operaƟng in Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam have benefited from 
diversificaƟon during the ongoing U.S.‐China trade war, but are sƟll dependent on Chinese inputs. ShiŌing 
low‐value operaƟons to Southeast Asia, such as systems integraƟon, could likely be done relaƟvely quickly – 
and some firms have – but shiŌing or adding addiƟonal high‐value nodes such as back‐end (assembly, 
packaging, and tesƟng) faciliƟes to the region will require incenƟves and support. At a minimum, a 
dedicated, coordinated effort on the part of the United States and Japan is essenƟal to improve the 
investment environment.    
How can the United States and Japan help? Programs and iniƟaƟves are needed to address myriad 
weaknesses in Southeast Asia. Semiconductor manufacturing requires robust infrastructure, for example 
stable electricity supply, deep logisƟcal networks, a large talent pool of engineers and STEM workers, and a 
technology ecosystem that includes startups and small or medium enterprises to fill gaps and provide 
innovaƟons. The United State and Japan can fund high quality infrastructure, frame curriculum for 
semiconductor industry training through public‐private partnerships, and help build capacity in logisƟcal, 
regulatory, and judiciary systems.    
The burden in many of these areas will fall on specific Southeast Asian governments themselves, but the 
United States and Japan should assist. EffecƟvely diversifying the regional technology supply chain to 
miƟgate the impact of pending and future shocks may depend on it. 
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